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STATEMENT OF PARTIES

{

Consistent with Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(1) and (b), the caption of this case contains
a complete list of all parties to the proceedings below. Nonetheless, the parties to this
i

action are as follows:
1. Appellant/Plaintiff: Steven Van Den Eikhof
2. Appellee/Defendant: Vista School, a Utah Public Charter School
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(3)0), § 78A-3-102(4) and § 78A-4-103(2)G). On January 20, 2011, the Supreme
Court of Utah entered an order transferring this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. at
534).
REVISED STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the appellant to submit
"a statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Additionally,
each issue stated must include "citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court." Id. Van Den Eikhof s "Issues Presented for Review55 lacks
this required information. In order to properly focus the scope of appellate review, Vista
School will provide the standard of appellate review, inclusive of supporting authority,
for each of Van Den Eikhof s stated issues. However, Van Den Eikhof alone bears the
burden of showing that he properly preserved each of his stated issues for appeal.
Accordingly, Vista School declines to do so for him.
Issue Number 1: Did the trial court err in deeming unanswered admissions as
admitted when the method of service was at issue? Standard of Review: Correctness The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, which the appellate
courts review for correctness. State ex rel. E.R., 2000 UT App 143, ^ 6, 2 P.3d 948; see
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also Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings. L.L.C.. 2010 UT 40, If 10, 238 P.3d 1035.
Issue Number 2: Did the trial court err in deeming unanswered admissions as
admitted when the admissions sought admissions to legal conclusions? Standard of
Review: Correctness - The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of
law, which the appellate courts review for correctness. State ex rel. E.R., 2000 UT App
143, Tf 6, 2 P.3d 948; see also Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, L.L.C., 2010 UT
40, f 10,238P.3dl035.
Issue Number 3: Did the trial court err in ruling that the deemed admissions were
determinative in defeating Van Den Eikhof s causes of action? Standard of Review:
Abuse of Discretion - If after an appellate court concludes the trial court's interpretation
of Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a) was correct and it is then called upon to review the trial court's
refusal to permit withdrawal of admissions under Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b), the abuse of
discretion standard is the proper appellate standard of review. State ex rel. E.R., 2000 UT
App 143 atffl[6-7 (citing Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1060-61
(Utah 1998)).
Issue Number 4: Did the trial court err in denying Van Den Eikhof s Motion to
Amend or Withdraw Admissions? Standard of Review: Conditional Discretionary
Standard - Appellate courts review the denial of a motion to withdraw admissions under
a "conditional discretionary standard," first determining whether certain conditions have
been met and then determining whether the trial court abused the discretion that is
allowed once the conditions have been met. Barnes v. Clarkson, 2008 UT App 44,fflf9,
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11-12, 178 P.3d 930, cert, denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008) (citing Langelandv.
Monarch Motors, Inc., supra); accord State ex rel. E.R., 2000 UT App 143 at f 7.
Issue Number 5: Did the trial court err in striking Van Den Eikhof s affidavit
filed in opposition to Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment? Standard of
Review: Broad Grant of Discretion (a very liberal version of the Abuse of Discretion
Standard) - In Murdock v. Springville Municipal Corp., the Utah Supreme Court ruled as
follows:
There is no established standard for reviewing a decision striking affidavits.
However, since an affidavit is simply a method of placing evidence of fact
before the court, we look to our prior decisions regarding the admission of
evidence more generally. The standard of review for the admission of
evidence varies depending on the type of evidence at issue. For example,
in State v. Pena, we stated that the decision to admit evidence under Utah
Rule of Evidence 403 was on the "broad end of the [discretion] spectrum"
like u[o]ther rulings on the admission of evidence [that] also generally
entail a good deal of discretion." . . . In civil cases such as the present one,
where the evidence sought to be introduced does not raise concerns of the
type that have produced heightened standards of sensitivity, a trial court
decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion.
1999 UT 39,1| 25, 982 P.2d 65 (citations omitted, alterations in original).
Issue Number 6: Did the trial court err in granting Vista School's Motion for
Summary Judgment? Standard of Review: Correctness - The appellate courts resolve
only legal issues in reviewing a summary judgment, giving no deference to the trial
court's view of the law, but reviewing it for correctness, Wilkinson v. Washington City,
2010 UT App 56, % 4, 230 P.3d 136.
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DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah R. Civ. P. 5 (See full text of rule in Van Den Eikhof s Addendum No. 1)
Utah R. Civ. P. 36 (See full text of rule in Van Den Eikhof s Addendum No. 2)
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (See full text of rule in Van Den Eikhof s Addendum No. 3)
Utah R. App. P. 24 (See full text of rule in Vista School's Addendum No. 1)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about April 29, 2009, Vista School sent Van Den Eikhof, an applicant for
employment as a teacher, a written conditional offer of employment. Afterward, a
dispute arose between the parties as to the terms of the conditional offer and effect of
issuing the letter. Vista School contended it was not a binding offer of employment and,
further, even if it was, Van Den Eikhof had not fulfilled the stated preconditions to accept
the offer. Van Den Eikhof contended that the conditional offer of employment was a
binding offer, which he accepted; and, further, that after he accepted the offer, Vista
School reneged on the offer to his legal detriment. (R. at 1-28, passim).
Thereafter, on November 20, 2009, Van Den Eikhof made written demand upon
Vista School's former counsel to compensate him for lost wages and benefits and
punitive damages. Vista School rejected Van Den Eikhof s written demand, resulting in
the filing of this lawsuit. (R. at 1-28, passim).
On May 19 (via email) and 20 (via U.S. Mail), 2010, Vista School propounded its
First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production of
Documents to Van Den Eikhof ("First Set of Discovery Requests"). Van Den Eikhof
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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failed to serve timely responses to the First Set of Discovery Requests, including the

{

Requests for Admissions.1 On August 2, 2010, approximately six weeks after the
deadline had passed for responding to the First Set of Discovery Requests, Vista School
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, which was based on the legal effect of the
deemed admissions and Van Den Eikhof s noncompliance with various provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah ("GI A"). (R. at 80-103, passim).

<

Upon receiving Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment, Van Den Eikhof s
counsel contacted Vista School's counsel, claiming to have never received the First Set of
Discovery Requests and requesting that Vista School voluntarily withdraw its Motion for
Summary Judgment. Vista School's counsel reminded Van Den Eikhof s counsel that
the First Set of Discovery Requests had been transmitted via email as well as regular U.S.
Mail, and that Van Den Eikhof s counsel had electronically responded to the transmittal
email. Van Den Eikhof s counsel acknowledged receipt of the email containing the First
Set of Discovery Requests, but claimed not to have opened the email attachment with the
First Set of Discovery Requests and not to have received a paper copy of the First Set of
Discovery Requests in the U.S. Mail. (R. at 365-368, passim).
Vista School's counsel advised Van Den Eikhof s counsel that Vista School would
not voluntarily withdraw its Motion for Summary Judgment because the motion dealt
with more than just the legal effect of the deemed admissions; specifically, Van Den

1

To this day, Van Den Eikhof has never served responses to any of Vista School's First
Set of Discovery Requests. (R. at 477, *[[5).
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i

Eikhof s failure to comply with the written notice of claim and other requirements of the
GIA. Instead, Vista School's counsel suggested that the parties more earnestly explore
settlement options and agreed to indefinitely extend the deadline for Van Den Eikhof to
respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Vista School's counsel understood that
Van Den Eikhof s counsel agreed to this approach. However, a few days later, Van Den
Eikhof served the following motions upon Vista School: (1) Motion for Summary
Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims; (2) Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions;
(3) Motion to Amend Complaint; and (4) Motion for Sanctions. At this same time, Van
Den Eikhof also filed his Memorandum in Response to [Vista School's] Motion for
Summary Judgment. (R. at 365-368, passim).
On October 20, 2010, the trial court convened a hearing on all of the foregoing
motions as well as Vista School's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Steven Van Den
Eikhof, dated August 25, 2010. The trial court granted all of Vista School's motions and
denied all of Van Den Eikhof s motions. (R. at 467; 536, passim). Van Den Eikhof is
now pursuing this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As with the other sections of his appellate brief, Van Den Eikhof has failed to cite
to the record when setting forth his Statement of Facts. Accordingly, this Court may
assume the correctness of the judgment of the trial court. See Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.,
746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (reasoning "[i]f a party fails to make a concise
statement of the facts and a citation of the pages in the record where those facts are
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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supported, the court will assume the correctness of the judgment below. This Court need

{

not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record.");
accord Steele v. Bd. of Review Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Accordingly, this Court may properly disregard Van Den Eikhof s Statement of Facts and
assume the correctness of the judgment of the trial court.
Notwithstanding, in accordance with Utah R. App. 24(a)(7), Vista School sets
forth the following facts from the trial court's various orders, inclusive of citations to the
record, that are determinative of the issues on appeal:
Order Denying Van Den EikhoFs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions
1.

Van Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions centered on

his contention that he was never properly served with Vista School's First Set of
Discovery Requests, including the Requests for Admissions. (R. at 492, ^j 1).
2.

The Certificate of Discovery for Vista School's First Set of Discovery

Requests states that service was effectuated upon Van Den Eikhof s counsel by email and
U.S. Mail. (R. at 51-52).
3.

Van Den Eikhof s counsel acknowledged that he received the transmittal

email to which Vista School's First Set of Discovery Requests were attached as an
exhibit. (R. at 126, If 1; 131,12; 222, f 2; 226, f 1; 362, f 1; 413; 536, pp. 17:2-11).
4.

The trial court determined that the testimony and exhibits (R. at 281-312)

proffered in the multiple affidavits (R. at 276-280; 365-368) of Vista School's counsel as
well as Van Den Eikhof s counsel's acknowledgment that he opened at least some of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

attachments to the email, "clearly preponderated" in favor of Van Den Eikhof having
been properly served with [Vista School's] First Set of Discovery Requests—via email
and U.S. Mail. (R. at 492,12; 536, pp. 10:8-11:23 and 17:2-11).
5.

Additionally, the trial court determined that Van Den Eikhof s motion and

memoranda wholly failed to follow the standards promulgated by Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b)
and Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998) to properly move a
court to amend or withdraw the deemed admissions. (R. at 492-495,ffif4-11; 536, pp.
10:8-11:23).
Order Granting Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment
6.

Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment dealt with two issues: first,

the effect of the deemed admission; and, second, Van Den Eikhof s failure to comply
with various provisions of the GIA. (R. at 63-103, passim; 181-227, passim).
7.

The trial court's Order Granting [Vista School's] Motion for Summary

Judgment addressed both of these issues as well as the legal consequences of Van Den
Eikhof s failure to properly oppose Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment in
accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) and (e). (R. at 476-490, passim: 536, pp. 11:2412:16).
8.

Vista School propounded its First Set of Discovery Requests, inclusive of

Requests for Admissions, to Van Den Eikhof via email on May 19, 2010, and via U.S.
Mail on May 20, 2010. (R. at 477, ffif 1-2).
9.

Vista's First Set of Discovery Requests advised Van Den Eikhof that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Requests for Admissions would be deemed admitted unless Van Den Eikhof served
responses within 30 days from the date propounded. (R. at 83-84; 477,1} 4).
10.

Van Den Eikhof has never served written responses to any of Vista

School's First Set of Discovery Requests, including the Requests for Admissions, (R, at
477, Tj 5).
11.

In accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2), the trial court concluded that

the Requests for Admissions became "conclusively established facts." (R. at 477-478, fflf
6-7).
12.

The trial court then concluded that the deemed admissions became

undisputed material facts for purposes of summary judgment; and as such, one or more of
the necessary elements for each of Van Den Eikhof s causes of action was conclusively
disproved. (R. at 478-484, passim).
13.

Van Den Eikhof s First Cause of Action was for "Breach of Contract,

Refusal to Honor Original Offer." Van Den Eikhof contended as follows regarding the
alleged contract:
The Defendant made a clear offer of employment on or about April 29,
2009 for a base salary of $34,622.00 . . . in writing to Plaintiff. Defendant
instructed Plaintiff to sign said offer to accept the contract.
Plaintiff accepted this contract by signing Defendant's offer on May 1,
2009 and also by complying with all of its terms for employment
Defendant issued a different offer which had a base salary of $30,576.65 . .
. which was $4,045.35 . . . less than the original signed contract.
Defendant mandated that Plaintiff sign to maintain employment with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

Defendant for the 2009/2010 school year.
When Plaintiff refused to sign the new offer, seeking to remain with his
original contract he had made with Defendant, he was terminated.
(R. at 8-9, U161-65; 479,1f 10).
14.

The trial court reasoned that the admitted facts established that Van Den

Eikhof had to approve and sign a Salary Agreement as a condition precedent to the
formation of a contract, which he never did as evidenced by the following Requests for
Admissions:
Please admit that the Vista Letter [the April 29, 2009 letter] contained
conditions that had to be fulfilled before you became an employee of Vista
School. Admission 2.
Please admit that the Vista Letter states that it did not serve as a formal
employment agreement. Admission 3.
Please admit that the Vista Letter states that you will complete a "hiring
process." Admission 4.
Please admit that the Vista Letter provides that you had to sign a Salary
Agreement to formally accept employment from Vista School. Admission
5.
Please admit that you did not sign a Salary Agreement with Vista School.
Admission 6.
Please admit that you were given an opportunity to sign a Salary
Agreement on or about August 14, 2009. Admission 7.
(R. at 480, f 13).
15.

Van Den Eikhof s Second Cause of Action was for "Breach of Contract-

Nonpayment of Benefits." Van Den Eikhof contended as follows regarding the alleged
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contract to pay particular benefits:
Within the benefits package that Plaintiff accepted in Defendant's offer,
said benefits would amount to approximately $1,389.00 . . . per month in
cash value.
On or about August 13, 2009, Plaintiff and other employees were told by
Principal that School's intention was to give 100% paid medical insurance
premiums.
Defendant included benefits within the first written contract amounting to
approximately $1,389.00 . . . a month, which was also promised orally to
Plaintiff
Defendant failed to provide said benefits to Plaintiff.
(R. at 9-10,1fl| 21, 39, 69 and 70; 480-481,114).
16.

The trial court reasoned that the following Requests for Admissions

invalidated Van Den Eikhof s Second Cause of Action:
Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with any written
agreement wherein you were offered 100% medical insurance benefits at no
cost to you as alleged in Paragraph 39 of your Complaint. Admission 17.
Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with any written
agreement that stated that you would receive $1,389 a month in benefits as
alleged in Paragraphs 21 and 69 of your Complaint. Admission 18.
(R. at 481,1|i5).
17.

Van Den Eikhof s Third Cause of Action was for "Fraud and Fraud in

Inducement." Van Den Eikhof contended as follows regarding the alleged fraud:
Defendant made representations within its first contract offer that were
accepted that Plaintiff would have a teaching position with a base pay of
$34,622.00 . . . . Such representations were furthered by oral statements, the
fact that Plaintiff was sent for training in California, and the fact that
Plaintiff attended a week long teacher training in St. George over the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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summer with no other contract offers until the school year had already
started at Washington County School District and George Washington
Academy.
Vista School's representations were material facts made to induce Plaintiff
to work for School. The fact that a second contract was offered to Plaintiff
so late caused harm to Plaintiff in that he could not find another teaching
position.
Plaintiff reasonably relied on the original contract, relied on the fact that it
would not be altered for at least the 2009/2010 school year, and gave up
another teaching position based on the original salary agreed to by
Defendant.
Defendant knew or should have known that such a move would compel
Plaintiff to accept the contract offer.
(R. at 10,1fl[ 73-76; 481-482, ^ 17).
18.

In regards to the alleged fraud claims, the trial court reasoned that the

formation of an employment contract was the "presently existing material fact" upon
which the entire fraud claim was predicated. However, Requests for Admissions Nos. 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 17 and 18 clearly established that an employment contract was never formed.
(R. at 482419).
19.

Additionally, the trial court determined the following Requests for

Admissions eliminated Van Den Eikhof s ability to claim there was an inducement and
justified reliance upon it, which are necessary elements to prove fraud:
Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista reception as
alleged in Paragraph 32 of your Complaint. Admission 14.
Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista teacher training
as alleged in Paragraph 34 of your Complaint. Admission 15.
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Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista teacher training
rr\t

(

if

o-n^g^vi 1x1 J. a i a ^ i d p i i ^ o u i ) u u i ^ u i i i p i a i n i . -M.UIIII»»JLUII ± u .

Please admit that you exchanged verbal communications with employees or
representatives of Vista School regarding your compensation prior to
actually receiving the proposed Salary Agreement. Admission 29.

<

Please admit that you were made aware on or before August 2, 2009 that
Vista School's proposed Salary Agreement would be less than you had
originally believed. Admission 30.
i

Please admit that you had communications with a Vista School employee
regarding your base salary on or before August 25 2009. Admission 31.
Please admit that George Washington Academy never presented you with a
written offer of employment for the 2009-2010 school year. Admission 32.
(R. at 482-483^ 20).
20.

Van Den Eikhof s Fourth Cause of Action was for "Negligent

Misrepresentation-Defendant waited until the start of the fall school year to propose a
new contract." Van Den Eikhof contended as follows regarding the alleged negligent
misrepresentation:
In the alternative to any fraud causes of action, Plaintiff asserts negligent
misrepresentation with the fact that Defendant waited until after the
2009/2010 school year had started within Washington County in an attempt
to force Plaintiff to accept a new contract for lower pay and lesser benefits
knowing that he would be unable to find another teaching position with
another school.
Defendant made representations that were at least negligent and careless so
as to induce action by Plaintiff to accept the contract offered.
Defendant had a duty of care to Plaintiff to act reasonably which would
have included giving Plaintiff adequate notice ahead of time of the
contractual change to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to seek other teaching
positions if he so chose to do so.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R. at 11, H 78-80; 483-484, % 22).
21.

The trial court reasoned that the same Requests for Admissions that

defeated Van Den Eikhof s Third Cause of Action for fraud likewise defeated his Fourth
Cause of Action for negligent misrepresentation. If there was no contract there could
have been no false representations about a non-existent contract. The trial court similarly
observed there was no way for a claimant to validly assert reasonable reliance upon the
formation of a contract he acknowledged never existed. (R. at 484, ^ 24).
22.

Van Den Eikhof s Fifth Cause of Action was for "Attorneys [sic] fees and

Costs." The trial court reasoned that Van Den Eikhof would have to first prevail on one
or more of his other causes of action and then establish a contractual or statutory basis
under Utah law before he would be entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs.
Since he could do neither, the trial court also dismissed this claim as a matter of law. (R.
at 484,U 25).
23.

The trial court observed that the Utah Strategic Planning Act for

Educational Excellence, the statute creating public charter schools, provides as follows:
"An employee of a charter school is a public employee and the governing body is a
public employer in the same manner as a local school board for purposes of tort liability."
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-la-514(l). Under Utah law, public school boards and school
districts are "political subdivisions" and therefore "governmental entities" as provided by
the GIA. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-102(3) and (7). Therefore, the trial court determined
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Vista School was a political subdivision and a governmental entity of the State of Utah.
(R. at 485, If 26).
24.

Van Den Eikhof s Complaint against Vista School was brought in

professed compliance with the GIA, (R. at 1-2,fflf2-5; 485,1128),
25.

The trial court observed that the GIA prohibits judgments against

governmental entities for exemplary or punitive damages. (R. at 485, ^f 29).
26.

Accordingly, the trial court determined that Van Den Eikhof s claims for

"punitive damages for pain and suffering as well as loss of financial opportunities in the
amount of three times (3X) the amount of judgment^]" must be dismissed as a matter of
law. (R. at 486,130).
27.

The trial court additionally observed that the GIA provides absolute

immunity from suit for claims arising out of or in connection with "infliction of mental
anguish . . . [and] misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or
intentional"; and, therefore, to the extent Van Den Eikhof intended when praying for
damages "for pain and suffering" for infliction of mental anguish to assert such a claim,
it, along with his claim for negligent misrepresentation, were absolutely barred. (R. at
486, m 31-32).
28.

Finally, the trial court observed that "Van Den Eikhof s effort to oppose

Vista [School's] Motion for Summary Judgment was wholly deficient. (R. at 486, Tf 33).
29.

The main point of argument in Van Den Eikhof s Memorandum in

Response to [Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment was his contention that his
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counsel was never properly served with Vista School's First Set of Discovery Requests.
(R. at 134-135; 486, t 34).
30.

The trial court determined as follows:

Examination of Vista's Motion for Summary Judgment demonstrates that
every assertion of an undisputed material fact was supported in accordance
with Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the
Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of [Vista School's] Motion for
Summary Judgment sets forth an explanation as to the timing and sequence
for the filing of [Vista School's] First Discovery Request. Therefore, each
of the deemed admitted Requests for Admissions then became undisputed
material facts that Van Den Eikhof had an obligation to oppose by affidavit
or as otherwise provided by Rules 56(c) and (e).
Conversely, examination of Van Den Eikhof s Memorandum in Response
to [Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment reveals that it was not
supported by any affidavits, references to Vista's pleadings, or any other
form of evidence required under Rule 56(c) to properly oppose a motion for
summary judgment.
(R. at 487,ffl[36-37; 536, p. 12:2-8).
31.

The trial court went on to conclude as follows:

Since Van Den Eikhof s opposition memorandum is facially defective, the
Court may properly disregard Van Den Eikhof s "Facts in Dispute" and
enter summary judgment in favor of Vista because the Affidavit of J.
Gregory Hardman in Support of [Vista School's] Motion for Summary
Judgment established a prima facie case for summary judgment.
(R. at 488,t 39).
Order Granting Vista School's Motion to Strike Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit
32.

The trial court struck Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit because it was untimely

filed and replete with evidentiary problems. (R. at 507-512, passim; see Van Den
Eikhof s Affidavit, R. at 263-264).
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33.

On August 2, 2010, Vista School filed its Motion for Summary Judgment

and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of [Vista School's] Motion for
Summary Judgment. (R. at 60; 63; 507, ^ 1).
34.

The Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Vista School's

Memorandum was supported by the affidavit of its counsel. (R. at 80-103; 507, ^f 2).
35.

On August 11,2010, Van Den Eikhof filed his Memorandum in Response

to [Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment, which was not supported by any
affidavit or other form of evidence as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). (R. at 134-142;
507,13).
36.

On August 25, 2010, Vista School filed its Reply Memorandum in Support

of [Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 181; 507,14).
37.

Van Den Eikhof s failure to properly support his responsive memorandum

with affidavits or other required evidence was one of the primary counterarguments in
[Vista School's] Reply Memorandum. (R. at 507,14).
38.

Furthermore, Van Den Eikhof filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on

Breach of Contract Claims on July 29, 2010. (R. at 55; 507, t 5).
39.

On August 19, 2010, Vista School filed its Memorandum in Opposition to

Van Den Eikhof s Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims. Van
Den Eikhof s failure to properly support his Memorandum with affidavits or other
required evidence was one of the primary counterarguments in Vista School's
Memorandum in Opposition. (R. at 151; 507-508, ^J 6).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

40.

On August 26, 2010, Vista School's counsel received a certified mail

envelope in which was enclosed, among other documents, a copy of the Affidavit of
Steven Van Den Eikhof, dated August 25, 2010. (R. at 389, t 7; 412; 508, f 6).
41.

The trial court determined that "Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit [was]

procedurally defective because it was filed weeks after his Memorandum in Response to
[Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 508, | 8).
42.

The trial court also determined that Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires affidavits

and other evidentiary materials to be filed contemporaneously with the responsive
memorandum they support. (R. at 508,19; 536, p. 9:1-8).
43.

The trial court observed as follows:

[Van Den Eikhof] filed his Memorandum in Response to [Vista School's]
Motion for Summary Judgment on or about August 11, 2010. [Van Den
Eikhof s] Memorandum in Response makes absolutely no reference to any
supporting affidavit or other proper form of evidence. Yet, [Van Den
Eikhof] submitted his Affidavit two weeks or more later; and by this time,
Vista School had already properly opposed [Van Den Eikhof s] Motion for
Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims as well as issued [Vista
School's] Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment.
(R. at 509, If 10).
44.

Upon examining Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit, the trial court determined "it

[was] nothing more than a non-specific form affidavit^]" and the alleged facts it sought
to incorporate by reference (i.e., the factual allegations and arguments of Van Den
Eikhof s legal counsel) were "clearly not based on [Van Den Eikhof s] first-hand,
personal knowledge . . ." and contained inappropriate lay witness opinion testimony and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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legal conclusions. (R. at 509- 511,fflf14-21; 536, p. 9:9-11).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Vista School's arguments follow two lines of analysis. The first line of analysis
concerns the legal effects of Van Den Eikhof s failure to follow nearly all of the appellate
briefing requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24 and discrepancies between his Notice of
Intent to Appeal and Brief of the Appellants [sic]. The second line of analysis examines
the trial court's creation of a proper procedural foundation in disposing of the parties5
various interlocutory motions, which, in turn, then properly supported the trial court's
legal conclusions when granting Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Regarding the first line of analysis, the following conventions of Utah R. App. 24
have been violated by Van Den Eikhof: subsection (e) - no citations to the record;
subsection (a)(5) - no standard of appellate review or supportive legal authorities for
each of his stated issues; subsection (a)(5)(A) - no citation to the record showing issues
preserved in the trial court; subsection (a)(7) - no citations to the record for statement of
facts in accordance with subsection (e); and subsection (a)(9) - most of the argument
section lacks citations to legal authorities. Subsection (k) of this rale provides as follows:
"Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer."
Utah R. App. P. 24(k) (2008). Many of the case annotations to Rule 24 discuss an
appellate court's prerogative to reject such a brief. See, e.g., MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d
941, 947-49 (Utah 1998) (the Supreme Court declined to address any of the arguments in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a brief that failed to meet almost every requirement of Rule 24). Lastly, Van Den Eikhof
has not briefed three of the six orders on motions referenced in his Notice of Intent to
Appeal; namely, the Order Denying [Van Den Eikhof s] Motion for Summary Judgment
on Breach of Contract Claims, the Order Denying [Van Den Eikhof s] Motion to Amend
Complaint, and the Order Denying [Van Den Eikhof s] Motion for Sanctions. The Court
should therefore refuse to entertain Van Den Eikhof s appeal of these orders.
Regarding the second line of analysis, by not addressing the standards of review
for each of his issues and disregarding the trial court's systematic treatment of the
interlocutory motions (e.g., Motion to Strike Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit and Motion to
Amend or Withdraw Admissions), Van Den Eikhof has inappropriately leapt to a facial
examination of the writing allegedly forming a contract between the parties. He argues
the mere fact the parties disagree over the legal effect of the writing precluded the trial
court from granting Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment. He also attempts to
excuse his failure to comply with the requirements of Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure when opposing Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment. These
arguments are misplaced.
There was indeed a purpose to the order in which the trial court ruled on the
parties' motions. The trial court first examined Vista School's Motion to Strike Van Den
Eikhof s Affidavit. The trial court, applying its "broad grant of discretion" when
examining evidence of this type, correctly concluded that the affidavit was untimely and
fraught with evidentiary problems. Once stricken, Van Den Eikhof s opposition to Vista
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School's Motion for Summary Judgment was stripped of any proper evidence to oppose
the Motion. The next interlocutory motion considered by the trial court was Van Den
Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions. Utah appellate courts have been
clear in their direction to trial courts when reviewing motions to amend or withdraw
admissions: they must apply the two-part test explained in Langeland. 952 P.2d at 1060
(observing that "judicial discretion is permitted only after certain preliminary conditions
have been met"); accord Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah
1985); Kotterv.Kotter. 2009 UT App 60, f 16, 206 P.3d 633. The trial court
appropriately observed that Van Den Eikhof did not even mention the Langeland test or
attempt to apply its principles in his moving memorandum, thereby preventing the trial
court from ever getting to a point where it was permitted to exercise discretion regarding
the withdrawal or amendment of the deemed admissions. Therefore, when reviewing
Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment and determining that Vista School had
properly supported all of its statement of undisputed material facts, the trial court had no
choice other than to grant Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment. See, e.g.,
Kotter, 2009 UT App 60 at % 22 (holding that the trial court committed reversible error
when it denied summary judgment based upon requests for admissions that were deemed
admitted when no timely responses were served).
ARGUMENT
i. Van Den Eikhof has failed to properly cite to the record and comply with
most other briefing requirements set forth in Utah R. App. P. 24; accordingly,
his brief should be disregarded or stricken pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(k).
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Examination of Van Den Eikhof s Brief of Appellants [sic] (hereinafter "Van Den
Eikhof Brief') demonstrates that it fails to meet nearly every requirement of Rule 24 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Perhaps most grievous of his multiple offenses is
his failure, throughout his brief, to cite to the record. Subsection (e) is clear in its
mandate: "References [in appellate briefs] shall be made to the pages of the original
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b). .. ." Utah R. App. P. 24(e) (emphasis
added).
Subsection (a)(5) requires an appellant to "provide a statement of the issues
presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with
supporting authority." Id. at 24(a)(5). Although Van Den Eikhof sets forth six issues for
review, none of them contains a standard of appellate review with supportive legal
authority. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 3-4). Utah appellate courts have observed as
follows:
The standard of review requirement in Subdivision (a)(5) should not be
ignored. The purpose of this requirement is to focus the briefs, thus
promoting more accuracy and efficiency in the processing of appeals.
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). When an appellant ignores
this important requirement an appellate court may "assume the correctness of the trial
court's judgment." Id
Subsection (a)(7) requires an appellant's brief to contain a statement of facts: "All
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations
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to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7)
(emphasis added). Not only did Van Den Eikhof fail to properly cite to the record for his
statement of facts and proceedings below, nearly all of what he cites contradicts the
record! For example, in the very last sentence of the "Background" portion of Van Den
Eikhof s Statement of Facts, he states: "At the negotiation, it was determined that [Van
Den Eikhof] was constructively terminated from his position with Vista due to his failure
to accept the reduced offer." (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 6). The trial court made no such
finding of constructive termination. Further still, in the last sentence of the first
paragraph of the "Procedural Facts " portion of Van Den Eikhof s brief, he states: "no
agreement had been reached in regard to service by email and [Van Den Eikhof] logically
assumed that the email was a "heads up" or courtesy." (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 6). The
trial court made no such finding of fact. Relatedly, in the very next sentence, Van Den
Eikhof states as follows:
Apparently, [Vista School's] secretary signed a Certificate of Service
alleging that the discovery "originals" were sent on May 20, 2011 [sic].
Whether due to a mistake by this secretary or by the postal service, these
discovery papers never arrived at the office of [Van Den Eikhof s] counsel.
(Van Den Eikhof Brief at 6). The trial court never made these findings of fact. To the
contrary, the trial court determined that Van Den Eikhof was properly served with Vista
School's First Set of Discovery Requests by email and U.S. Mail. (R. at 492, % 2; 536,
pp. 10:8-11:23 and 17:2-11). Further still, Van Den Eikhof states: "Defense counsel
refused to extend any time to answer the improperly served discovery or to acknowledge
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that a mistake might have been made by his office or the post office." (Van Den Eikhof
Brief at 7). Again, the trial court never made these findings; it determined service was
properly effectuated by email and U.S. Mail. (R. at 492,12; 536, pp. 10:8-11:23 and
17:2-11). Additionally, Vista School's counsel's affidavit flatly contradicts Van Den
Eikhof s counsel's summary of the attorneys' discussions about this point. (R. at 365368). More importantly, in regards to the Requests for Admissions, an extension of time
was not even possible since, by operation of law, they were long since deemed admitted.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a). Further still, Van Den Eikhof states as a procedural fact the
following: "Appellant's counsel filed the appropriate motions to amend or withdraw as
well as an opposition memorandum to the Motion for Summary Judgment." (Van Den
Eikhof Brief at 7). Quite apart from being "appropriate motions and briefs," the trial
court determined all of the briefs filed by Van Den Eikhof in regards to these two
motions were wholly deficient. (R. at 476-490, passim; 536, pp. 11:24-12:16; 492-495,
ffl[ 4-11; 536, pp. 10:8-11:23). Finally, Van Den Eikhof puts forth the following as a
procedural fact: "The judge then deemed all admissions as admitted, struck Appellee's
[sic] affidavit in support of its [sic] opposition to the Summary Judgment, and granted
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment despite the fact that a clear contract had
been formed with the self-labeled 'offer of employment9 and subsequent acceptance"
(emphasis added). (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 7). The trial court never found the parties
formed a "clear contract" or that it was "accepted."
Subsection (a)(9), covering the argument section of appellate briefs, requires
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"citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9). As discussed above, nowhere in his brief does Van Den Eikhof cite to the
record. Moreover, the entire argument section of his brief contains citations to only two
cases; and in one of these, he misquotes the cited passage and misstates the holding of the
case. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 13-14). Consequently, there is no legal authority to
support much of what Van Den Eikhof argues is law. Subsection (a)(9) also requires
arguments that "contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added). As discussed above, Van
Den Eikhof listed no appellate standards of review or supporting authorities for each of
his issues. As such, the argument section of his brief contains none of the required
analysis applying proper standards of appellate review to the trial court's rulings on
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follows: "'Admit you lose5 type requests, or requests to admit legal conclusions, are
objectionable and not a proper basis for admission." (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 13). Such
quoted text is nowhere found within this case. Admittedly, the concept of admissions
calling for legal conclusions is discussed in this case. Id at 100-01. Notwithstanding,
the Jensen court, addressing a somewhat similar situation as this matter on appeal, stated:
"However, even if a request is objectionable, if a party fails to object and fails to respond
to the request, the party should be held to have admitted the matter." Id. Van Den
Eikhof additionally contends that the admissions at issue in this appeal are of the "exact
type" contemplated by the court in Jensen. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 14). They are not.
In Jensen, the single objectionable request justifying court intervention on principles of
equity sought an admission that "plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages." Id. at 101.
The Utah Supreme Court observed that the problem with this admission was that among
the other matters deemed admitted there were "no admissions concerning several of the
factors which should be considered in determining the amount of the punitive damages
award." Id Accordingly, the case v/as "remanded to the trial court for a trial on the issue
of punitive damages and entry of judgment according to the matters deemed
admitted by defendant." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, Jensen does not stand for
the propositions of law asserted by Van Den Eikhof.
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appeal. Instead, the argument section of Van Den Eikhof s brief is largely a recitation of
his failed arguments to the trial court.
As documented above, Van Den Eikhof s brief is defective on many fronts.
Subsection (k), entitled ''[r]Requirements and sanctions, " states, in pertinent part, as
follows: "Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion
or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending
lawyer." Utah R. App. P. 24(k). An appellate brief that sets forth little legal analysis on
the issues presented, does not specifically discuss how the trial court erred, and presents
no citations to the record fails to conform to the requirements of Rule 24. Phillips v.
Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109-10 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). When presented with such a
brief, an appellate court may properly disregard the brief and assume the correctness of
the judgment of the trial court. MacKav v. Hardy. 973 P.2d 941, 947-49 (Utah 1998) (the
Supreme Court declined to address any of the arguments in a brief that failed to meet
almost every requirement of Rule 24); accord Phillips, 904 P.2d at 1110; Koulis, 746
P.2d at 1185. This Court should similarly reject Van Den Eikhof s brief and assume the
correctness of the trial court's judgment.
2. Van Den Eikhof s Notice of Intent to Appeal challenges the trial court's
rulings on six motions. Notwithstanding, his Brief of Appellants [sic] confines
these appellate proceedings to only three of the six motions and
corresponding orders: the Order Granting Vista School's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Order Denying Van Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend
or Withdraw Admissions, and the Order Granting Vista School's Motion to
Strike the Affidavit of Steven Van Den Eikhof.
Van Den Eikhof s Notice of Intent to Appeal lists the following orders of the trial
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I

court for appeal:
(a) Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment;
(b) Order Denying Plaintiffs Molion to Amend Complaint;
(c) Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of
Contract Claims;
(d) Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions;
(e) Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions; [and]
(f) Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Steven
Van Den Eikhof, Dated August 25, 2010.
(R. at 527-528). However, in his Brief of Appellants [sic] he does not include any of the
required information for this Court to consider the Order Denying Plaintiff s Motion to
Amend Complaint, the Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on
Breach of Contract Claims, or the Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions.
Accordingly, this Court should refuse to entertain Van Den Eikhof s appeal of these three
orders and affirm the trial court's rulings as to each. MacKay, 973 P.2d at 947-48
(observing that "the [Utah Supreme Court], as well as the court of appeals, has held in
numerous cases that [they] will not address issues not adequately briefed").
3. The trial court properly struck Van Den EikhoPs Affidavit because it was
untimely filed and replete with evidentiary problems.
When examining the trial court's decision to strike Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit,
this Court must review the trial court's decision "on the broad end of the discretion
spectrum." Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39,125, 982 P.2d 65. The
trial court struck Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit because it was untimely filed and replete
with evidentiary problems. (R. at 507-512, passim; see Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit, R. at
263-264).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

97

In regards to the timeliness of Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit, Rule 56(e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure implies that affidavits and other evidentiary materials must be
filed contemporaneously with the responsive memorandum.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). The trial court observed that the proper
interpretation of Rule 56(e) required affidavits to be filed contemporaneously with the
memorandum they support. (R. at 536, p. 9:1-8). The trial court likewise observed that
every assertion of undisputed material fact in Vista School's Motion for Summary
Judgment was properly supported by an affidavit and that no part of Van Den Eikhof s
opposition memorandum was properly supported. (R. at 487,fflf36-37). When a motion
for summary judgment is filed and supported by an affidavit, the party opposing the
motion has an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or other materials allowed by
Rule 56(e). D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989). This affirmative
duty to respond by submitting a counter-affidavit or other appropriate materials would
have no meaning if the time to do so was other than contemporaneously with the
opposition memorandum. Therefore, the trial court very clearly did not abuse its
discretion when holding Van Den Eikhof failed to timely discharge this affirmative duty.
Van Den Eikhof argues that he simply forgot to attach his Affidavit to his
opposition memorandum, implying a clerical oversight. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 17).
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This Court, like the trial court, should find this assertion highly suspect. (R. at 536, 11:29). The trial court observed as follows:
[Van Den Eikhof] filed his Memorandum in Response to [Vista School's]
Motion for Summary Judgment on or about August 11, 2010. [Van Den
Eikhof s] Memorandum in Response makes absolutely no reference to any
supporting affidavit or other proper form of evidence. Yet, [Van Den
Eikhof] submitted his Affidavit two weeks or more later; and by this time,
Vista School had already properly opposed [Van Den Eikhof s] Motion for
Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims as well as issued [Vista
School's] Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment.
(R. at 509, ^f 10). Indeed, according to the notary endorsement on Van Den Eikhof s
Affidavit it was not even signed and notarized until August 25, 2010. (R. at 263-264).
Next, the trial court examined the content of Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit,
concluding that it was replete with evidentiary problems. (R. at 508-511,1fl| 7-22; 536,
9:9-11). The trial court's Order Granting Vista School's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of
Steven Van Den Eikhof separately examined each evidentiary problem with the Affidavit
and provided citations to Utah case law rejecting affidavits with such evidentiary defects.
(R. at 509-511,ffi[13-21).
Striking Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit under these circumstances was not an abuse
of the trial court's broad grant of discretion. In Murdock v. Springville Municipal Corp.,
the appellants contended the trial court erred when it struck certain affidavits found by
the trial court to be "riddled with hearsay," thereby justifying entry of partial summary
judgment. 1999 UT App 39 at f 24. When determining whether it was proper for the
trial court to have stricken such an affidavit in a civil case, the Utah Supreme Court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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determined as follows:
There is no established standard for reviewing a decision striking affidavits.
However, since an affidavit is simply a method of placing evidence of fact
before the court, we look to our prior decisions regarding the admission of
evidence more generally. The standard of review for the admission of
evidence varies depending on the type of evidence at issue. For example,
in State v. Pena, we stated that the decision to admit evidence under Utah
Rule of Evidence 403 was on the "broad end of the [discretion] spectrum"
like "[o]ther rulings on the admission of evidence [that] also generally
entail a good deal of discretion." . . . In civil cases such as the present one,
where the evidence sought to be introduced does not raise concerns of the
type that have produced heightened standards of sensitivity, a trial court
decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion.
IdL at ^| 25 (internal citations omitted, alterations in original).
Based on the foregoing, the trial court could not have abused its broad grant of
discretion when it struck Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit. Accordingly, the judgment of the
trial court must be affirmed.
4. Van Den Eikhof wholly failed to satisfy the two-part Langeland test, thereby
justifying the trial court's denial of Van Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend or
Withdraw Admissions.
Van Den Eikhof asserts that the trial court "abused its discretion when it
disallowed the Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions." (Van Den Eikhof Brief at
16). He further suggests that the two-part test explained by the Utah Supreme Court in
Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998), does not apply to him.
(Van Den Eikhof Brief at 16-17). Van Den Eikhof s argument is misplaced.
In Langeland, the Utah Supreme Court outlined the proper procedures parties must
follow and the test trial courts must apply in regards to a Rule 36(b) motion for
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withdrawal or amendment of admissions. Id at 1060-64. The following statements,
explanations and analyses from Langeland are instructive:
Our decisions interpreting [Rule 36(b)] have used similar language,
conditioning the trial court's discretion on the satisfaction of the rule's
preliminary conditions:
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b) provides that those matters deemed admitted are
conclusively established as true unless the trial court, on motion by the
defendant, permits withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. The trial
court has the discretion to permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions
when the presentation of the merits of the action would be served and the
party obtaining the admissions fails to satisfy the court that he will be
prejudiced in maintaining his action. The trial court does not have
discretion to unilaterally disregard the admissions.
Id at 1060 (citing Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 1985))
(emphasis in original). The Supreme Court continued its analysis by stating
[bjecause the trial court's decision to grant a rule 36(b) motion is not
entirely discretionary, our review of such a decision is not a typical review
for "abuse of discretion." Instead, we review these decisions in two steps,
using what might be called a "conditional" discretionary standard. In the
first step, we review the trial court's determinations as to whether
amendment or withdrawal would serve the presentation of the merits and
whether amendment or withdrawal would result in prejudice to the
nonmoving party. In the second step, we review the trial court's discretion
to grant or deny the motion. The trial court has discretion to deny a motion
to amend, but its discretion to grant such a motion conies into play only
after the preliminary requirements are satisfied. Decisions placed
within the discretion of the trial court can be reversed only upon a finding
of abuse of discretion, i.e., if there is no reasonable basis for the decision.
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch. But because the rule does not give the trial
court discretion to disregard the preliminary conditions of rule 36(b),
its judgment as to whether those conditions have been satisfied is
subject to a somewhat more exacting standard of review.
Id. at 1060-61 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
After announcing the elements of the test to determine whether admissions should
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be withdrawn or amended, the Supreme Court then explained the responsibilities of the
parties on each side of a Rule 36(b) motion.
Having concluded that the burden [to establish the first half of the first
part of the test, i.e., serving the presentation of the merits] falls on the
party moving for amendment, we are still faced with the question of just
how that burden may be met. [The party seeking amendment or
withdrawal] argues that on the basis of federal court interpretations of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the presentation of the merits of an action
is served by amending admissions anytime the merits are contested. Clark
v. City of Munster. Arguing from this authority, [the party seeking
amendment or withdrawal] submits that its own unsworn denial of the
matters admitted against it should suffice to convince the court that a
presentation of the merits would be served by amendment of its admissions.
However, the time to deny admissions is within thirty days of receiving the
request for admissions. Once these matters have been admitted against a
party, something more than a bare denial is required to convince the court
that the admissions should be withdrawn or amended and that the merits of
the matter should be argued in court. The test under rule 36(b) may
therefore be articulated as follows: To show that a presentation of the
merits of an action would be served by amendment or withdrawal of an
admission, the party seeking amendment or withdrawal must (1) show
that the matters deemed admitted against it are relevant to the merits
of the underlying cause of action, and (2) introduce some evidence by
affidavit or otherwise of specific facts indicating that the matters
deemed admitted against it are in fact untrue.
Id. at 1062 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
Applying this two-part test to the facts of Langeland the Supreme Court
determined that
[the party seeking amendment or withdrawal] has failed to come forward
with evidence of specific facts indicating that the matters deemed admitted
against it are in fact untrue. Consequently, [the party seeking amendment or
withdrawal] has not established that the presentation of the case on the
merits would be subserved by the withdrawal or amendment of the
admissions.
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Id. at 1063 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court observed that
[t]he record is devoid of any sworn statement that [the subject admissions
are] untrue. Instead, both the brief and the motion focus almost exclusively
on the second-tier requirement that the nonmoving party fails to show
prejudice from the amendment or withdrawal of the admissions.
Id. When this occurs, the Supreme Court stated that such failure "relieves the [the nonmoving party] of the burden of showing that he would suffer prejudice as a result of the
withdrawal or amendment of the admissions." Id.
The trial court determined that Van Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw
Admissions was devoid of any sworn statement or other appropriate evidence to
challenge the veracity of the deemed admissions. (R. at 495, f 10). Thereafter, following
the instructions given to trial courts in Langeland, the trial court exercised proper restraint
in refusing to consider the substance of the admissions (i.e., the second half of the first
part of the test) because Van Den Eikhof had failed to establish the first half of the first
part of the test (i.e., serving the presentation of the merits). Under this clear directive
from the Utah Supreme Court, the trial court had no choice other than to deny Van Den
Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions. See, e.g., Kotter v. Kotter, 2009
UT App 60, ^J 22, 206 P.3d 633 (finding that summary judgment based upon deemed
admissions was improperly denied by a trial court).
The time and method for Van Den Eikhof to have made his argument about the
alleged inadequacy of service and to otherwise contradict the admissions and show
prejudice was in an affidavit filed contemporaneously with his motion seeking to set
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aside the deemed admissions. He did not do so. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court must be affirmed.
5. Vista School was not required to file a motion to have the Requests for
Admissions deemed admitted; they were deemed admitted by operation of
law.
In the Summary of Arguments section of Van Den Eikhof s brief he suggests that
Vista School was required to file a motion to deem its admissions admitted. (Van Den
Eikhof Brief at 8). This is not the law. Rule 36(a) very clearly provides that "matters
shall be deemed admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service
of the request." Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a). Numerous Utah cases reinforce this procedural
standard. See, e.g.. Kotter. 2009 UT App at ^ 4, n.6; State ex rel. E.R., 2000 UT App
143,111,2 P.3d 948; Langeland. 952 P.2d at 1060.
6. The trial court appropriately determined that Van Den Eikhof was properly
served with Vista School's First Set of Discovery Requests by email and U.S.
Mail.
As explained above, the trial court determined that the evidence "clearly
preponderated" in favor of Van Den Eikhof having been properly served with Vista
School's First Set of Discovery Requests—via email and U.S. Mail. (R. at 492, ^ 2; 536,
pp. 10:8-11:23 and 17:2-11). The trial court reached this conclusion following its
examination of the following matters appearing of record: (1) Vista School's signed
Certificate of Discovery, which indicated that service was effectuated by email and U.S.
Mail (R. at 51-52; 477, ^ 3); (2) Vista School's First Set of Discovery Requests that
properly advised Van Den Eikhof that the Requests for Admissions would be deemed
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admitted if not responded to within 30 days (R. at 83-84; 477, f 4); (3) the affidavits of
Vista School's counsel pertaining to the details of service, including transmittal email
with attached First Set of Discovery Requests, law firm postage logs, and emails
exchanged between counsel (R. at 492, If 2); and (4) Van Den Eikhof s counsel's
acknowledgements that he received the transmittal email to which Vista School's First
Set of Discovery Requests were attached as an exhibit (R. at 126, ^f 1; 131, ^f 2; 222, *[f 2;
2 2 6 4 1; 362, If 1; 413; 536, pp. 17:2-11).
As explained in Vista School's Revised Statement of the Issues above, correctness
is the proper standard of appellate review to resolve the issue of whether the trial court
erred in deeming the Requests for Admissions as admitted when the method of service
was at issue. Therefore, this Court must determine whether the trial court correctly
interpreted and applied the various procedural rules and Utah cases bearing upon the
resolution of this issue.
Van Den Eikhof misstates the trial court's resolution of this issue by singly
characterizing the trial court's analysis as having determined that service by email was
effective. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 8 and 10-13). In addition to its determination that
service by email was effective, the trial court also determined that service was effectuated
by U.S. Mail. (R. at 492, Tf 2; 536, pp. 10:8-11:23 and 17:2-11). Although the trial court
found service was effectuated in two ways, the trial court effectively determined that
either method alone would have been effective and proper service.
Rules 5 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are the applicable rules of
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procedure that bear on the resolution of this issue. Rule 36(a)(1) requires requests for
admissions to contain u a notice advising the party to whom the request is made that,
pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless said request is
responded to within 30 days after service of the request or within such shorter or longer
time as the court may allow." Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). There is no dispute that Vista
School's First Set of Discovery Requests contained this required notice. (R. at 83-84;
477, ]f 4). There is likewise no dispute that Van Den Eikhof has never served responses
to Vista School's Requests for Admissions. (R. 477, | 5). Accordingly, the trial court
correctly applied the requirements of Rule 36 to this issue.
Next, Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows: "If a party is
represented by an attorney service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon
the party is ordered by the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1). Van Den Eikhof was
represented by counsel so Vista School directed the First Set of Discovery Requests to
Van Den Eikhof s counsel. (R. at 51-52; 477, ^ 3). Rule 5 additionally provides seven
alternative means for service of court papers. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1)(A). In regards to
email service, the rule directs "by sending it by email to the person's last known email
address if that person has agreed to accept service by email." IcL at 5(b)(l)(A)(ii). There
is no dispute that Van Den Eikhof s counsel received the First Set of Discovery Requests
by email. (R. at 126, Tf 1; 131,12; 222,12; 226, f 1; 362, % 1; 413; 536, pp. 17:2-11).
In regards to service by U.S. Mail, the rule provides as follows: "by mailing it to the
person's last known address." IcL at 5(b)(l)(A)(iv). There is no dispute as to Van Den
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Eikhof s counsel's last known address; every document he has filed with the trial court

{

and this Court contains the same address. Finally, Rule 5 provides the following
statement as to when service is complete:
<

Service by mail, email or fax is complete upon sending. Service by
electronic means is not effective if the party making service learns that the
attempted service did not reach the person to be served.
Id. at 5(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). As stated above, there is no dispute that Van Den

{

Eikhof s counsel received the First Set of Discovery Requests by email. (R. at 126, Tf 1;
131,12; 222, f 2; 226,11; 362, If 1; 413; 536, pp. 17:2-11). A literal reading of this
i

subsection of Rule 5 suggests that the only exception to the general rule that service is
complete upon sending is when the sender learns that email service did not make it to the
recipient. Van Den Eikhof s only contention is that he did not receive the First Set of
Discovery Requests by U.S. Mail. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 10-13). However, as
explained in the fourth argument section of this brief, when attempting to move the trial

{

court to amend or withdraw the deemed admissions, Van Den Eikhof wholly failed to
meet his burden under the two-part Langeland test, by providing affidavits or any other
<

form of evidence, to satisfy the first part of the "presentation of the merits" prong of the
test. (R. at 495, HTf 10-11).
Van Den Eikhof attempts, notwithstanding his acknowledgement that he received

<

the First Set of Discovery Requests via email, to avoid the consequences of a literal
reading of Rule 5 by arguing that his counsel never agreed in writing to accept service by
i

email. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 10-13). There is no merit to this argument. Utah courts
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have determined that actual notice of discovery requests is sufficient to invoke a timely
obligation to respond. See, e.g., Aurora Credit Serv., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc.,
2006 UT App 48, ^ 4, 129 P.3d 287 (citing Morgan v. Continental Banking Co.. 938 P.2d
271, 275 (Utah 1997) (affirming the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s claims under rule
37 where plaintiff "admitted that he received the discovery requests as well as the motion
to compel" because it was "disingenuous for [plaintiff] to . . . argue that he was not aware
of his obligation to respond"); Utah Dep't Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah
1995) (affirming default judgment against defendant under rule 37, even though
defendant denied receiving some of the discovery motions, because defendant "was given
ample notice of the proceedings against him and his obligations under the law").
In view of the abundant controlling case law—standing for the proposition of law
that actual notice of discovery requests invokes an obligation to timely respond—the trial
court determined that Rule 5 required Van Den Eikhof to serve timely responses to Vista
School's Requests for Admissions following acknowledged receipt of them by Van Den
Eikhof s counsel. (R. at 536, 11:10-22 and 17:2-11). Accordingly, the trial court
correctly applied the requirements of Rule 5 and its interpretive case law.
7. Based on the procedural circumstances of this action there was nothing
inappropriate about the form of Vista School's Requests for Admissions.
Admittedly, many of Vista School's Requests for Admissions seek admissions
applying the law to facts, which are always proper; and some of them may be construed
as seeking purely matters of law, which would ordinarily be improper. "However, even
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if a request is objectionable, if a party fails to object and fails to respond to the request,
that party should be held to have admitted the request." Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr.,
Inc., 702 P.2d at 100-01; accord Kotter, 2009 UT App 60 at ffl 17-19; InreE.R., 2000
UT App 143 at If 21. Accordingly, there is no merit to Van Den Eikhof s argument (Van
Den Eikhof Brief at 13-14) that the form of two of the deemed admissions prevented the
trial court from granting Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Van
Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions.
In State ex rel. E.R., the Utah Court of Appeals examined a strikingly similar
series of facts (sans additional component of service of discovery requests by email) and
lower court proceedings. 2000 UT App 143, 2 P.3d 948. In re E.R. was an appeal arising
from an action filed by the State against E.R.'s father, N.R., for alleged abuse of his
eleven-year-old daughter. Id. at ]f 1. Prior to trial, counsel for N.R. sent the State and the
Guardian Ad Litem requests for admissions to which they never responded. Id The
juvenile court deemed the requests admitted in accordance with Rule 36(a), and entered
judgment in favor of the father "on the strength of the State's and Guardian Ad Litem's
'admissions.'" Id. The State appealed. Id The appellate court affirmed the judgment of
the juvenile court. Id.
Not unlike this matter on appeal, counsel for the father in E.R. served
interrogatories, requests for productions of documents, and requests for admissions upon
the State. Id. at ^j 4. The corresponding certificate of service for these discovery requests
showed that a copy had been mailed to the Attorney General's Office and the Office of
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the Guardian Ad Litem. Id The father requested that the State and the Guardian Ad
Litem admit to three things:
1. Please admit that all injuries to the child, as alleged herein, were not
inflicted by the natural father.
2. Please admit that the natural father has neither neglected nor abused said
child.
3. Please admit that the child is a dependent.
Id. No response was submitted by the State or Guardian Ad Litem. Id The day before
trial, the father filed a motion asking the court to deem those matters admitted. Id.
On the morning of trial, the father's motion was heard. Id at ^j 5. The State and
the Guardian Ad Litem argued that "neither had received the father's requests for
admissions and knew nothing about the request until receiving the motion to enter the
admissions the previous afternoon." Id.
Finding that the mailing certificate indicated the discovery request was sent, and
neither the State nor the Guardian Ad Litem timely responded, the juvenile court
reasoned that because the requests for admissions "were properly served [pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1)], and "were neither objected to nor denied, the father's requests
were deemed admitted." Id The juvenile court also concluded that the admissions "were
conclusive on the issue of the father's alleged abuse and no additional evidence would be
required from the parties." Id
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals was first asked to decide whether the trial
court misapplied Rule 36(a) in deeming the requests admitted. Id. at ^ 6. If the appellate
court concluded that the trial court's interpretation of the rule was correct, it was then
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called upon to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
permit withdrawal of the admissions under Rule 36(b), given the overriding concern
about the child's best interest. Id.
The State argued that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in deeming that
matters admitted because the court should not have faulted the State for failing to respond
to requests for admissions the State never received. Id. at ^f 8. The Utah Court of
Appeals reasoned as follows:
Had the trial court in fact found that the State had never been served with
the requests, the State's argument would be correct. However, the State
reads too much into the trial court's findings of fact in this regard.
Taken as a whole, the import of the court's finding is that while the
responsible attorneys never received the requests, the requests were served
upon their respective offices, which was enough to trigger the responsibility
to respond within 30 days.
r>
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some internal routing problem. This is not a valid excuse.
Id atfflf8-9 (citations omitted).
The State additionally argued, much like Van Den Eikhof, that "the type of
admissions requested by the father were plainly objectionable, and the trial court erred in
even considering them." Id. at If 21. The Utah Court of Appeals noted that the State's
argument was "well taken, albeit untimely." Id. (emphasis added). The Court reasoned
that while '"admit you lose' type requests, or requests to admit legal conclusions, are
objectionable," . . . when a party fails to timely and properly object, "the party should
nonetheless be held to have admitted the matter." Id. (citing Jensen, 702 P.2d 100-01).
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The Utah Court of Appeals held as follows:
We conclude the trial court in this case correctly implemented the mandate
of Rule 36(a) by ruling that the requested matters were admitted by
operation of law. The potential harshness of automatic admission is
mitigated—and the need for the blanket exemption sought by the State
completely undercut—by the escape hatch provided in Rule 36(b), which
allows a trial court to withdraw or amend an admission "if the merits of the
underlying action will be advanced by such withdrawal and if the party
requesting the admissions fails to convince the court that it will be
prejudiced by such withdrawal." As explained above, the trial court's
decision not to override the admissions is reviewed under a somewhat more
exacting abuse of discretion standard.
Id at Tf 13 (citations omitted).
Where E.R. is instructive on its points of similarity it is also equally instructive for
its points of dissimilarity. Unlike the State, Van Den Eikhof s counsel has acknowledged
receipt of Vista School's First Set of Discovery Requests. Further unlike the State, Van
Den Eikhof failed to properly attempt to overcome the effect of the deemed admissions
by proceeding under Rule 36(b).
The foregoing analysis is clear: the trial court correctly applied the requirements of
Rules 5 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as well as their interpretive case law
when recognizing and then applying the deemed admissions. Accordingly, the judgment
of the trial court must be affirmed.
8. The trial court properly granted Vista School's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
As explained in the Summary of the Arguments section above, there was indeed a
purpose to the order in which the trial court ruled on the parties' motions. The trial court
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first examined Vista School's Motion to Strike Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit. The trial
court, applying its "broad grant of discretion," correctly concluded that the affidavit was
untimely and fraught with evidentiary problems. Once stricken, Van Den Eikhof s
opposition to Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment was stripped of any proper
evidence to oppose the Motion. The next interlocutory motion considered by the trial
court was Van Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions. The trial court
appropriately observed that Van Den Eikhof never even mentioned the required two-part
Langeland test or attempted to apply its principles in his moving memorandum. This
failure prevented the trial court from ever getting to a point where it was permitted to
exercise discretion regarding the withdrawal or amendment of the deemed admissions.
The trial court summarized its analysis as follows:
On [Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment, [Vista School] has 32
statements of fact all from the request for admissions, and according to
Utah law those are conclusively proved. [Van Den Eikhof s] opposing
memorandum attempts to disprove two of the asserted facts which, if done
correctly, might prevent summary judgment. [Van Den Eikhof], however,
offers no citation to any affidavit, any discovery or any other relevant
materials. [Van Den Eikhof] also includes more unprofessional language.
No genuine issue of material fact appears in regard to [Vista School's]
motion for summary judgment.
On the legal issues, the governmental immunity both because of substance
and because of [Van Den Eikhof s] failure to file - 1 won't say it's
meaningless, but the meager $300 undertaking I conclude bars [Van Den
Eikhof s] claims. [Vista School's] analysis of those issues is very
thorough. The response to it is simply insufficient. I conclude [Vista
School] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and so [Vista School's]
motion for summary judgment is granted.
(R. at 536, 11:24-12:16).
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Having already established that the trial court properly resolved each of the
interlocutory motions underpinning the Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court must
now confine its analysis to whether the trial court correctly applied the undisputed
material facts to the law. There are two facets to this legal analysis: first, the effect of the
deemed admissions upon Van Den Eikhof s causes of action; and, second, Van Den
Eikhof s failure to follow various requirements of the GIA.
The Legal Effect of the Deemed Admissions
As thoughtfully examined and explained in the trial court's Order Granting [Vista
School's] Motion for Summary Judgment, one or more of the necessary elements to
establish a prima facie case for every one of Van Den Eikhof s five causes of action was
disproved by virtue of the deemed admissions. (R. at 479-484,fflf10-25). The trial
court's Order contains Utah case citations setting forth the required elements for each
cause of action, followed by an analysis of the deemed admissions disproving one or
more of these required elements. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded all of Van
Den Eikhof s causes of action were barred as a matter of law.
Van Den Eikhof s Failure to Follow the GIA
The Utah Strategic Planning Act for Educational Excellence, which is the statute
creating public charter schools, provides as follows: "An employee of a charter school is
a public employee and the governing body is a public employer in the same manner as a
local school board for purposes of tort liability." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-la-514(l).
Under Utah law, public school boards and school districts are "political subdivisions" and
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therefore "governmental entities" as provided by the GIA. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7102(3) and (7). Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that Vista School was a
political subdivision and a governmental entity of the State of Utah.
The GIA "governs all claims against governmental entities or against their
employees or agents arising out of the perfoiTaance of the employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-101(2)(b).
The GIA further provides that "an action under this chapter against a governmental entity
for an injury caused by an act or omission that occurs during the performance of an
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a
plaintiffs exclusive remedy." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-202(3)(a). The trial court
therefore properly concluded that Van Den Eikhof s tort claims were brought in
professed compliance with the GIA. (R. at 485, f 28).
Upon determining that Van Den Eikhof s tort claims were brought pursuant to the
GIA, the trial court then examined Van Den Eikhof s attempted compliance with GIA
requirements. The GIA states as follows:
At the time the action is filed, the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a sum
fixed by the court that is:
(a) not less than $300; and
(b) conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs incurred
by the governmental entity in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the
action or fails to recover judgment.
Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-601(2). Lawsuits where the plaintiff fails to deposit this
undertaking should be dismissed, albeit without prejudice. Rippstein v. City of Provo,
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929 F.2d 576 (10th Cir. 1991); Hansen v. Salt Lake Cnty., 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990).
Observing that Van Den Eikhof never paid the $300 undertaking upon filing his lawsuit,
the trial court properly cited this failure as a basis for entry of summary judgment. (R. at
536, 12:9-12).
The trial court next reviewed the substance of Van Den Eikhof s tort claims in
comparison to the GIA's express grants of immunity from suit. The GIA states: "A
judgment may not be rendered against a governmental entity for exemplary or punitive
damages." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-603. In paragraph 89 of Van Den Eikhof s
Complaint, he requested "punitive damages for pain and suffering as well as loss of
financial opportunities in the amount of three times (3X) the amount of judgment." (R. at
13, | 89). Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed these claims as a matter of law.
There is absolute immunity from suit under the GIA for claims arising out of or in
connection with "infliction of mental anguish . . . [and] misrepresentation by an employee
whether or not it is negligent or intentional." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(a) and (f).
To the extent Van Den Eikhof was asserting in the aforementioned paragraph 89 of his
Complaint by use of the phrase "for pain and suffering" a claim for damages for infliction
of mental anguish, the trial court appropriately concluded that such claim was absolutely
barred. (R. at 486, If 31). Similarly, the trial court properly concluded that Van Den
Eikhof s Fourth Cause of Action for negligent misrepresentation was likewise barred and
must be dismissed as a matter of law. (R. at 486,132).
Based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court's application of the undisputed
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material facts to the law, it is clear the trial court correctly granted Vista School's Motion
for Summary Judgment. Van Den Eikhof, however, takes umbrage at the trial court's
analysis, contending the trial court "ignored" material issues of fact. (Van Den Eikhof
Brief at 19). He contends the mere existence of the parties' competing motions for
summary judgment demonstrates, ipso facto, a disputed material fact that prevented the
trial court from granting Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Van Den
Eikhof Brief at 18). Utah appellate courts have determined such an argument lacks merit.
In D & L Supply v. Saurini, a supplier of goods sued a personal guarantor for
money owed on an open account maintained by the personal guarantor's company with
supplier. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1985). The personal guarantor filed an answer, asserting
that he was not personally responsible for the unpaid bills and contesting the trial court's
personal jurisdiction over him. Id. The supplier filed a motion for summary judgment
supported by the affidavits of its president and others, asserting facts that supported the
court's personal jurisdiction over the personal guarantor as well as the amount claimed to
be due and owing. Id. The personal guarantor did not file any opposition to the motion
for summary judgment, so the trial court entered judgment against the personal guarantor.
Id at 421.
On appeal, the personal guarantor argued that although he failed to properly
oppose the supplier's motion for summary judgment the mere existence of the parties'
contradictory pleadings precluded summary judgment. Id. The Utah Supreme Court
rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court, reasoning as follows:
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Rule 56(e) [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] expressly rejects
[personal guarantor's] premise. When a motion for summary judgment is
filed and supported by an affidavit, the party opposing the motion has an
affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or other materials allowed by
rule 56(e).
Id.
Similarly, in Kotter v, Kotter, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that a trial
court committed reversible error when it denied summary judgment based upon requests
for admissions that were deemed admitted when no timely responses were served. 2009
UT App 60 at 122. The Kotter Court farther observed:
While we recognize the harsh result rale 36 imposes on [the responding
party], we also must observe the rule's intent: to facilitate discovery. . ..
"The penalty for delay or abuse is intentionally harsh, and parties who fail
to comply with the procedural requirements of rule 36 should not lightly
escape the consequences of the rule."
Id at f 19 (citing Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1061).
Accordingly, this Court must similarly reject Van Den Eikhof s argument on this
issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
Having thoroughly examined two lines of analysis, Vista School has conclusively
demonstrated the following: (1) Van Den Eikhof failed to comply with nearly every
required convention of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, thereby
entitling this Court to disregard his appellate brief and assume the correctness of the trial
court's judgment; and (2) the trial court created a proper procedural foundation from
which to dispose of the parties' various interlocutory motions, which, in turn, then
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properly supported the trial court's legal conclusions when granting Vista School's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed in all respects.
7th

DATED this 7m day of July 2011.
SNOW JENSEN & REECE

Lewis P. Reece
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears
immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules,
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are
cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard
of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set
out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the
citation alone will suffice, and the provision shali be set forth in an addendum to the brief under
paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts
relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be
a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the recordrelied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state
the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this
paragraph. The addendum
be bound
the brief
unless
doing so makes the brief
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unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a
table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as
part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the
contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied 'with the
statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall
conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency
proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the
injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner
and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as
marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be
made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or
rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or
portions of the record
asby required
paragraph
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appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court
nthar\A/icQ n r r l o r c
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and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in
the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised
in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of CrossAppellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the
Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this
rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven
days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the
draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to
an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any
number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by
reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter
shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed
350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against
the offending lawyer. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Advisory Committee Notes
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley,
883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987).
"To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's
advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced
at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold
Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)
(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See
also State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782
P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990).
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable
standard of review and citation of supporting authority.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
Civil No. 090503847
VISTA SCHOOL, A UTAH PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOL,

Judge: G. Rand Beacham

Defendant.

The Court, having reviewed all briefs, affidavits and exhibits filed in support of or in
opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; having received a proper Request to
Submit for Decision for said Motion; having reviewed applicable cases and statutes relative to
the merits of the Motion; having received the arguments of the parties' counsel at a hearing
convened on October 20, 2010; and being fully advised in the matter; now, hereby, enters the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
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• FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

On or about December 23, 2009, Plaintiff Steven Van Den Eikhof (hereinafter

"Plaintiff5 or "Van Den Eikhof) filed his Complaint against Defendant Vista School (hereinafter
"Vista"), which contains causes of action and/or claims for the following: First Cause of Action Breach of Contract. Refusal to Honor Contract; Second Cause of Action - Breach of Contract,
Nonpayment of Benefits; Third Cause of Action - Fraud and.Fraud in the Inducement; Fourth
Cause of Action - Negligent Misrepresentation; Fifth Cause of Action - Attorneys Fees and Costs;
and Summary (Prayer for Relief) - claims for punitive damages.
2.

On May 20, 2010, Vista properly propounded its First Set of Requests for

Admissions, Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Van Den Eikhof
(hereinafter "Vista's First Discovery Request"). The Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman, ^j4, filed in
support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment confirms this fact.
3.

Also on May 20, 2010, Vista filed with the Court a Certificate of Discovery for its

First Discovery Request. Likewise, the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman, ^[5, confirms this fact.
4.

Vista's First Discovery Request advised Van Den Eikhof that the Requests for

Admissions would be deemed admitted unless Van Den Eikhof served responses within 30 days
from the date Vista's First Discovery Request was propounded.
5.

Van Den Eikhof has never served written responses to any of Vista's First

Discovery Request, including the Requests for Admissions.
6.

Rule 36(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly indicates that requests

for admissions will be deemed admitted if no responses are received from the requested party
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within 30 days. Courts have confirmed that if a party fails to provide a timely response to
requests for admissions, summary judgment may thereafter be granted based on the facts
established by the unanswered admissions. This is because the "matters deemed admitted are
conclusively established as true.55 Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge, 702 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 1985).
Indeed, Utah courts have noted that "the rule does not say the court may admit the matter—it
says ' [t]he matter is admitted' .... By simple operation of Rule. 3 6(a), parties who ignore requests
for admissions do so at their peril." State v. N.R., 2 P.3d 948, 951 (Utah App. 2000). Utah
courts have also stated that "a request for an admission of an ultimate fact or application of law
to fact is proper," and further that "even if a request is objectionable, if a party fails to object and
fails to respond to the request, that party should be held to have admitted the matter." Jensen,
702 P.2d at 100-101.
7.

In the present case, Van Den Eikhof has failed to respond to Vista's Requests for

Admissions and well more than 30 days have passed. Pursuant to Utah law, these requests for
admissions of fact are now "conclusively established facts."
8.

Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
9.

Summary judgment is appropriate in this case because the undisputed material

facts conclusively establish that Van Den Eikhof cannot satisfy any of the requisite elements to
establish any of the causes of action or claims for relief set forth in his Complaint based on the
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Requests for Admissions, which have all been deemed admitted, or due to the provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
10.

Van Den Eikhof s First Cause of Action is for "Breach of Contract, Refusal to

Honor Original Offer." Van Den Eikhof contends as follows regarding the alleged contract:
The Defendant made a clear offer of employment on or about April 29, 2009 for a
base salary of $34,622.00 [parenthetical spelling of dollar amount omitted] in
"- writing to Plaintiff. Defendant instructed Plaintiff to sign said offer to accept the
contract.
Plaintiff accepted this contract by signing Defendant's offer on May 1, 2009 and
also by complying with all of its terms for employment.
Defendant issued a different offer which had a base salary of $30,576.65
[parenthetical spelling of dollar amount omitted] which was $4,045.35
[parenthetical spelling of dollar amount omitted] less than the original signed
contract.
Defendant mandated that Plaintiff sign to maintain employment with Defendant
for the 2009/2010 school year.
When Plaintiff refused to sign the new offer, seeking to remain with his original
contract he had made with Defendant, he was terminated.
Complaint, ffi[61-65.
11.

The required elements necessary to form a legally enforceable contract are "offer,

acceptance, competent parties, and consideration." Uhrhahn Const. & Design, Inc. v. Hopkins,
2008 UT App 41, ^[12, 179 P.3d 808 (citing Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730,
732 (Utah 1985)).
12.

The admitted facts from Vista's Requests for Admissions conclusively

demonstrate there was no offer to be accepted.
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13.

The admitted facts establish that Van Den Eikhof had to approve and sign a

Salary Agreement as a condition precedent to the formation of a contract, which he never did as
evidenced by the following Requests for Admissions:
Please admit that the Vista Letter [the April 29, 2009 letter] contained conditions
that had to be fulfilled before you became an employee of Vista School.
Admission 2.
Please admit that the Vista Letter states that it did not serve as a formal - ,
employment agreement. Admission 3.
Please admit that the Vista Letter states that you will complete a "hiring process."
Admission 4.
Please admit that the Vista Letter provides that you had to sign a Salary
Agreement to formally accept employment from Vista School. Admission 5.
Please admit that you did not sign a Salary Agreement with Vista School.
Admission 6.
Please admit that you were given an opportunity to sign a Salary Agreement on or
about August 14, 2009. Admission 7.
14.

Van Den Eikhof s Second Cause of Action is for "Breach of Contract-

Nonpayment of Benefits." Van Den Eikhof contends as follows regarding the alleged
contract to pay particular benefits:
Within the benefits package that Plaintiff accepted in Defendant's offer, said
benefits would amount to approximately $1,389.00 [parenthetical spelling of
dollar amount omitted] per month in cash value.
On or about August 13, 2009, Plaintiff and other employees were told by
Principal that School's intention was to give 100% paid medical insurance
premiums.
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Defendant included benefits within the first written contract amounting to
approximately $1,389.00 [parenthetical spelling of dollar amount omitted] a
month, which was also promised orally to Plaintiff.
Defendant failed to provide said benefits to Plaintiff.
Complaint, ffi[21, 39, 69 and 70.
15.
of Action:

The following Requests for Admissions invalidate Van Den Eikhof s Second Cause
:

- '••"

Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with any written agreement
wherein you were offered 100% medical insurance benefits at no cost to you as
alleged in Paragraph 39 of your Complaint. Admission 17.
Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with any written agreement
that stated that you would receive $1,389 a month in benefits as alleged in
Paragraphs 21 and 69 of your Complaint. Admission 18.
16.

Additionally, if the elements necessary to form the basic employment

contract as alleged in Van Den Eikhof s First Cause of Action were not present, as
explained above, it logically follows that there could be no contract for related employee
benefits. Accordingly, Van Den Eikhof s Second Cause of Action for breach of contract
fails as a matter of law.
17.

Van Den Eikhof s Third Cause of Action is for "Fraud and Fraud in the

Inducement." Van Den Eikhof contends as follows regarding the alleged fraud:
Defendant made representations within its first contract offer that were accepted
that Plaintiff would have a teaching position with a base pay of $34,622.00
[parenthetical spelling of dollar amount omitted]. Such representations were
furthered by oral statements, the fact that Plaintiff was sent for training in
California, and the fact that Plaintiff attended a week long teacher training in St.
George over the summer with no other contract offers until the school year had
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already started at Washington County School District and George Washington
Academy.
Vista School's representations were material facts made to induce Plaintiff to
work for School. The fact that a second contract was offered to Plaintiff so late
caused harm to Plaintiff in that he could not find another teaching position.
Plaintiff reasonably relied on the original contract, relied on the fact that it would
not be altered for at least the 2009/2010 school year, and gave up another teaching
position based on the original salary agreed to by Defendant.
Defendant knew or should have known that such a move would compel Plaintiff'
to accept the contract offer.
Complaint, ffi[73-76.
18.

The elements of a fraud claim include the following:

(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which
was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6)
that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in
fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injur}7 and damage.
Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ^16, fn. 38, 201 P.3d 966 {citing Dugan v. Jones,
'

615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980)).
19.

In this instance, the formation of an employment contract would be the "presently

existing material fact" upon which the entire fraud claim is predicated. However, the abovecited Requests for Admissions clearly establish that an employment contract was never formed.
20.

Additionally, the following Requests for Admissions eliminates Van Den

Eikhof s ability to claim there was an inducement and justified reliance upon it, w7hich are
necessary elements to prove fraud:
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Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista reception as alleged in
Paragraph 32 of your Complaint. Admission 14,
Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista teacher training as
alleged in Paragraph 34 of your Complaint. Admission 15.
Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista teacher training
alleged in Paragraph 38 of your Complaint. Admission 16.
Please admit that you exchanged verbal communications with employees or
representatives of Vista School regarding your compensation prior to actually
receiving the proposed Salary Agreement. Admission 29.
Please admit that you were made aware on or before August 2, 2009 that Vista
School's proposed Salary Agreement would be less than you had originally
believed. Admission 30.
Please admit that you had communications with a Vista School employee
regarding your base salary on or before August 25 2009. Admission 31.
Please admit that George Washington Academy never presented you with a
written offer of employment for the 2009-2010 school year. Admission 32.
21.

Accordingly, Van Den Eikhof s Third Cause of Action for fraud fails as a matter

22.

Van Den Eikhof s Fourth Cause of Action is for "Negligent Misrepresentation-

of law.

Defendant waited until the start of the fall school year to propose a new contract." Van Den
Eikhof contends as follows regarding the alleged negligent misrepresentation:
In the alternative to any fraud causes of action, Plaintiff asserts negligent
misrepresentation with the fact that Defendant waited until after the 2009/2010 •
school year had started within Washington County in an attempt to force Plaintiff
to accept a new contract for lower pay and lesser benefits knowing that he would
be unable to find another teaching position with another school.
Defendant made representations that were at least negligent and careless so as to
induce action by Plaintiff to accept the contract offered.
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Defendant had a duty of care to Plaintiff to act reasonably which would have
included giving Plaintiff adequate notice ahead of time of the contractual change
to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to seek other teaching positions if he so chose to
do so.
Complaint, ffi|78-80.
23.

Negligent misrepresentation is defined as follows:

./;,Where(l) one having..apeqimary interest in
position to know material facts, and (3) carelessly or negligently makes a false
representation concerning them, (4) expecting the other party to rely and act
thereon, and (5) the other party reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in that
transaction, the representor can be held responsible if the other elements of fraud
are also present.
DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008 (Utah App. 1992) {citing Jardine v.
Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 381, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967)).
24.

The same Requests for Admissions that defeated Van Den Eikhof s Third

Cause of Action for fraud likewise defeat his Fourth Cause of Action for negligent
misrepresentation. If there was no contract there could have been no false representations
about a non-existent contract. Similarly, there is no way for a claimant to validly assert
reasonable reliance upon the formation of a contract he has acknowledged never existed.
25.

Van Den Eikhof s Fifth Cause of Action is for "Attorneys fees and Costs.5'

Van Den Eikhof would have to first prevail on one or more of his other causes of action
and then establish a contractual or statutory basis under Utah law before he would be
entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. Since he can do neither this claim also
fails as a matter of law.

^
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26.

The Utah Strategic Planning Act for Educational Excellence, which is the statute

creating public charter schools, provides as follows: "An employee of a charter school is a public
employee and the governing body is a public employer in the same manner as a local school
board for purposes of tort liability." Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-514(l). Under Utah law, public
school boards and school districts are "political subdivisions" and therefore "governmental
entities" as provided by the GovernmentaHmmunity Act of Utah. Utah Code Ann. §63G-7102(3) and (7). Therefore, Vista is a political subdivision and governmental entity of the State of
Utah.
27.

The Governmental Immunity Act of Utah "governs all claims against

governmental entities or against their employees or agents arising out of the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority." Utah Code
Ann. §63G-7-101(2)(b). The Governmental Immunity Act of Utah further provides that "an
action under this chapter against a governmental entity for an injury caused by an act or omission
that occurs during the performance of an employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive remedy." Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-202(3)(a).
28.

Van Den Eikhof s Complaint against Vista is brought pursuant to the

Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. See Complaint, ffi[2-5.
29.

The Governmental Immunity Act of Utah states: "A judgment may not be

rendered against a governmental entity for exemplary or punitive damages." Utah Code Ann.
§63G-7-603.
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30.

In paragraph 89 of Van Den Eikhof s Complaint, he requests "punitive damages

for pain and suffering as well as loss of financial opportunities in the amount of three times (3X)
the amount of judgment." Accordingly, these claims must be dismissed as a matter of law as
they violate the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
31.

Additionally, there is absolute immunity from suit under the Governmental

Immunity Act of Utah for claims arising out of or in connection with "infliction of mental'
anguish, ....[and] misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional/
Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-301(5)(b) and (f). To the extent Van Den Eikhof is asserting in the
aforementioned paragraph 89 of his Complaint by use of the phrase "for pain and suffering'' a
claim for damages for infliction of mental anguish, such claim is absolutely barred.
32.

Van Den Eikhof s Fourth Cause of Action for negligent misrepresentation is

likewise barred and must be dismissed as a matter of law.
33.

Additionally, the Court observes that Van Den Eikhof s effort to oppose Vista's

Motion for Summary Judgment was wholly deficient.
34.

The main contention of Van Den Eikhof s Memorandum in Response to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was that his counsel was not properly served with
Defendant's First Discovery Request and, accordingly, that the Requests for Admissions should
be withdrawn.
35.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part, as

follows:
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The motion, memorandum and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law (emphasis added).
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further states, in pertinent part, as follows:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. :
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to
file such a response (emphasis added).
36.

Examination of Vista's Motion for Summary Judgment demonstrates that every

assertion of an undisputed material fact was supported in accordance with Rule 56(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment sets forth an explanation as to the timing and
sequence for the filing of Defendant's First Discovery Request. Therefore, each of the deemed
admitted Requests for Admissions then became undisputed material facts that Van Den Eikhof
had an obligation to oppose by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rules 56(c) and (e).
37.

Conversely, examination of Van Den Eikhof s Memorandum in Response to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment reveals that it was not supported by any affidavits,
references to Vista's pleadings, or any other form of evidence required under Rule 56(c) to
properly oppose a motion for summary judgment.
38.

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that once the moving party on a motion

for summary judgment has properly established "a prima facie case for summary judgment," the
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opponent of the motion "must file responsive affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the trial
court's conclusion that there are no factual issues." Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659
P.2d 10405 1044 (Utah 1984); see also Bush Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d
1217, 1219 (Utah 1987).
39.

Since Van Den Eikhof s opposition memorandum is facially defective, the Court

may properly disregard Van Den Eikhof s "Facts in Dispute" and enter summary judgment in.
favor of Vista because the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment established a prima facie case for summary judgment.
40.

The language of Rule 56(e) is clear:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him.
Franklin Fin., 659 P.2d at 1044 (emphasis added).
41.

Finally, although not determinative of the outcome reached herein, the

Court notes that the testimony and exhibits proffered in the multiple affidavits of Vista's
legal counsel (specifically, the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions (e.g., emails exchanged by counsel, Vista's counsel's
postage records, etc.)) clearly preponderates in favor of Van Den Eikhof having been
properly served with Defendant's First Discovery Request.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court hereby enters
the following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
D A T E m J <&>

dayof(P(yfcfer

2010.
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

JmQE G. RAND BEACHAM
G. Rand Beacham
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true a correct copy of the UNSIGNED ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be delivered via
fist class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, as well as transmitted electronically, on this Q
November 2010. to the following:

Bryan T. Adamson, Esq.
THE JUSTICE FIRM, L.L.C,
205 East Tabernacle, Suite 2
St. George, UT 84770
badamson@dixielegal.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
/)

TYJAAWJ^iA. -AtTfSi
Legal A^sistan/'
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SNOW JENSEN & REECE
J. Gregory Hardman [8200]
Tyson C. Horrocks [12557]
Counsel for Defendant
Tonaquint Business Park, Bldg. B
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435)628-3688
Telecopier: (435) 628-3275

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND OR
WITHDRAW ADMISSIONS

v.
Civil No. 090503847
VISTA SCHOOL, A UTAH PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOL,

Judge: G. Rand Beacham

Defendant.

The Court, having reviewed all briefs, affidavits and exhibits filed in support of or in
opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions; having received a proper
Request to Submit for Decision for said Motion; having reviewed applicable cases and statutes
relative to the merits of the Motion; having received the arguments of the parties' counsel at a
hearing convened on October 20, 2010; and being fully advised in the matter; now, hereby,
enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The basis for Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions is centered

around his contention that he was never properly served with Defendant's First Set of
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions, and Requests for Production of Documents
(hereinafter "Defendant's First Discovery Request").
2./ \ However, the testimony and exhibits proffered in the multiple affidavits of
Defendant's legal counsel (specifically, the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions (e.g., emails exchanged by counsel,
Vista's counsel's postage records, etc.)) clearly preponderates in favor of Plaintiff having
been properly served with Defendant's First Discovery Request.
2.

Accordingly, there is no basis in law or fact for Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or

Withdraw Admissions.
3.

Moreover, the form of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions is

severely deficient.
4.

Under Utah law, a party seeking to withdraw or amend admissions must (a) show

that the matters deemed admitted against it are relevant to the merits of the underlying cause of
action, and (b) introduce some evidence by affidavit or otherwise of specific facts indicating that
the matters admitted against it are in fact untrue. A party's own unsworn denial of the matters
admitted against it is not sufficient.
5.

Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Effect of Admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively
established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the
admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a
pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party
who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or
amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.
Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending
action only and is not an admission by him for any other purpose nor may it be
used against him in any other proceeding (emphasis added).
6.

In Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court outlined the

proper procedures parties must follow and the test trial courts must apply in regards to a Rule
36(b) motion for withdrawal or amendment of admissions. 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998). The
following statements, explanations and analyses from Langeland are controlling upon this
Court's examination of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions.
7.

The Supreme Court observed that

[o]ur decisions interpreting [Rule 36(b)] have used similar language, conditioning
the trial court's discretion on the satisfaction of the rule's preliminary conditions:
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b) provides that those matters deemed admitted are
conclusively established as true unless the trial court, on motion by the defendant,
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. The trial court has the
discretion to permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions when the
presentation of the merits of the action would be served and the party obtaining
the admissions fails to satisfy the court that he will be prejudiced in maintaining
his action. The trial court does not have discretion to unilaterally disregard the
admissions.
Id. at 1060 (citing Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 1985)) (emphasis
in original). The Supreme Court continued its analysis by stating
[bjecause the trial court's decision to grant a rule 36(b) motion is not entirely
discretionary, our review of such a decision is not a typical review for "abuse of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

discretion.55 Instead, we review these decisions in two steps, using what might be
called a "conditional55 discretionary standard. In the first step, we review the trial
court's determinations as to whether amendment or withdrawal would serve the
presentation of the merits and whether amendment or withdrawal would result in
prejudice to the nonmoving party. In the second step, we review the trial court's
discretion to grant or deny the motion. The trial court has discretion to deny a
motion to amend, but its discretion to grant such a motion comes into play
only after the preliminary requirements are satisfied. Decisions placed within
the discretion of the trial court can be reversed only upon a finding of abuse of
discretion, i.e., if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). But because the rule does not give
the trial court discretion to'-disregard the preliminary7 conditions of rule
36(b), its judgment as to whether those conditions have been satisfied is
subject to a somewhat more exacting standard of review.
Id. at 1060-61 (emphasis added).
8.

After announcing the elements of the test to determine whether admissions should

be withdrawn or amended, the Supreme Court then explained the responsibilities of the parties
on each side of a Rule 36(b) motion. The Supreme Court determined as follows:
Having concluded that the burden [to establish the first half of the first part of the
test, i.e., serving the presentation of the merits] falls on the party moving for
amendment, we are still faced with the question of just how that burden may be
met. [The party seeking amendment or withdrawal] argues that on the basis of
federal court interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
presentation of the merits of an action is served by amending admissions anytime
the merits are contested. Clark v. City ofMunster, 115 F.R.D. 609, 612
(N.D.Ind.1987). Arguing from this authority, [the party seeking amendment or
withdrawal] submits that its own unsworn denial of the matters admitted against it
should suffice to convince the court that a presentation of the merits would be
served by amendment of its admissions. However, the time to deny admissions is
within thirty days of receiving the request for admissions. Once these matters
have been admitted against a party, something more than a bare denial is required
to convince the court that the admissions should be withdrawn or amended and
that the merits of the matter should be argued in court. The test under rule 36(b)
may therefore be articulated as follows: To show that a presentation of the
merits of an action would be served by amendment or withdrawal of an
admission, the party seeking amendment or withdrawal must (1) show that
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the matters deemed admitted against it are relevant to the merits of the
underlying cause of action, and (2) introduce some evidence by affidavit or
otherwise of specific facts indicating that the matters deemed admitted
against it are in fact untrue.
Id. at 1062 (emphasis added).
9.

Applying this two-part test to the facts of Langeland the Supreme Court

determined that
[the party seeking amendment or withdrawal] has failed to' come forward with
evidence of specific facts indicating that the matters deemed admitted against it
are in fact untrue. Consequently, [the party seeking amendment or withdrawal]
has not established that the presentation of the case on the merits would be
subserved by the withdrawal or amendment of the admissions.
Id. at 1063 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court observed that
[t]he record is devoid of any sworn statement that [the subject admissions are]
untrue. Instead, both the brief and the motion focus almost exclusively on the
second-tier requirement that the nonmoving party fails to show prejudice from the
amendment or withdrawal of the admissions.
Id. When this occurs, the Supreme Court stated that such failure "relieves the [the non-moving
party] of the burden of showing that he would suffer prejudice as a result of the withdrawal or
amendment of the admissions, []." Id.
10.

Examination of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions reveals that

it, too, is devoid of any sworn statement or other appropriate evidence challenging the veracity of
the deemed admitted Request for Admissions.
11.

Further, unlike the moving party in Langeland who at least made an effort—albeit

deficient—to address the second part of the two-part test, Plaintiff has not even mentioned the
two-part test. In fact, his motion and memorandum fail to mention Rule 36(b) altogether.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoingfindingsof fact and conclusions of law, the Court hereby enters
the following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions is

denied.
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FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

/fifD/

JUDGE Q. RAND BEACHAf

t ^ / R a n d Beacham
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true a correct copy of the UNSIGNED ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND OR WITHDRAW ADMISSIONS to be
delivered via fist class U.S. Mail postage prepaid, as well as transmitted electronically, on this
p-ffi

day of November 2010. to the following:

Bryan T. Adamson, Esq.
THE JUSTICE FIRM, L.L.C
205 East Tabernacle, Suite 2
St. George, UT 84770
badamson@dixielegal.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
]
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Legal Assist
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SNOW JENSEN & REECE
J. Gregory Hardman [8200]
Tyson C. Horrocks [12557]
Counsel for Defendant
Tonaquint Business Park, Bldg. B
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435) 628-3688
Telecopier: (435) 628-3275

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF
STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF,
DATED AUGUST 25, 2010

Plaintiff,
v.
VISTA SCHOOL, A UTAH PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOL,
Defendant.

'
Civil No. 090503847
Judge: G. Rand Beacham

The Court, having reviewed all briefs, affidavits and exhibits filed in support of or in
opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Steven Van Den Eikhof, dated
August 25, 2010; having received a proper Request to Submit for Decision for said Motion;
having reviewed applicable cases and statutes relative to the merits of the Motion; having
received the arguments of the parties' counsel at a hearing convened on October 20, 2010; and
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being fully advised in the matter; now, hereby, enters the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

On August 2, 2010, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
2.

The Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Defendant's Memorandum was

supported by the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, dated August 2, 2010.
3.

On or about August 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed his Memorandum in Response to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Examination of Plaintiff s Memorandum reveals
that its section entitled "Facts in Dispute" was not supported by any affidavit or other form of
evidence as required by U.R.C.P. 56(e).
4.

On August 25, 2010, Defendant filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Defendant's Reply Memorandum on file with
the Court.) Plaintiffs failure to properly support his Memorandum with affidavits or other
required evidence was one of the primary counterarguments in Defendant's Reply Memorandum.
5.

Furthermore, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of

Contract Claims on July 29, 2010.
6.

On August 19, 2010, Defendant filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs

Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Terms. Plaintiffs failure to properly
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support his Memorandum with affidavits or other required evidence was one of the primary
counterarguments in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition.
On August 26, 2010, Defendant's counsel received a certified mail envelope in which was
enclosed, among other documents, a copy of the Affidavit of Steven Van Den Eikhof, dated
August 25, 2010.
7., '

Utah courts have regularly observed that formalor evidentiary defects in an

affidavit in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived unless the
party opposing the affidavit files a motion to strike. See, e.g., Fox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 22 Utah
2d383,453P.2d701 (1969);Howickv. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 352 (1972);
Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877 (Utah 1979); Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d
1040 (Utah 1983); Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. Allred, 685 P.2d 544 (Utah 1984); Salt Lake City
Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
8.

Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit is procedurally defective because it was filed weeks

after his Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
9.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure implies that affidavits and other

evidentiary materials must be filed contemporaneously with the responsive memorandum.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added).
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10.

Plaintiff filed his Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment on or about August 11, 2010. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response makes absolutely
no reference to any supporting affidavit or other proper form of evidence. Yet, Plaintiff
submitted his Affidavit two weeks or more later; and by this time, Defendant had already
properly opposed Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims as
well as issued Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment.
11.

Plaintiffs late filing of his Affidavit is procedurally defective.

12.

At the very least, upon recognizing this procedural error in his briefing, Plaintiff

should have filed a motion with the Court to permit a late-filed affidavit; and in this event,
Defendant should be afforded an opportunity to file appropriate supplemental briefs and
affidavits to address the factual contentions set forth in the late-filed affidavit. Utah R. Civ. P.
56(e).
13.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and its many, many case

annotations require factual assertions in affidavits to be made on personal, first-hand knowledge.
Id. (stating "supporting and opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge"'); see also
Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, ^|20, 136 P.3d 1252 (stating "affidavits submitted in
support or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be based on the personal
knowledge of the affiant and may not be considered by the trial court" if they are not).
14.

Examination of the Affidavit of Steven Van Den Eikhof reveals that it is nothing

more than a non-specific form affidavit.
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15.

To the extent the Affidavit was offered in support of the "Facts in Dispute"

section of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
which is suggested by the caption title of the Affidavit, it is clearly not based on Plaintiffs firsthand, personal knowledge.
16.

The 'Tacts in Dispute" section of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Response to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (i.e., Plaintiffs claimed "Actual Facts") states as'..;'
follows:
Actual Fact: Plaintiff received an email on May 19, 2010 that had an
attachment labeled "Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests." It should be
noted that settlement negotiations were ongoing at this time. Since the email
stated that originals would follow in the mail, Plaintiff never opened the email
attachment. Many attorneys send proposed paperwork in emails or discuss filing
things that never end up getting filed.
The originals were never sent and since email is not a proper method for
service of discovery, the discovery was never served. In fact, counsel for Plaintiff
had not seen the discovery requests until the Motion for Summary Judgment was
served.
Actual Fact: Plaintiff objects to these admissions being admitted as the
Requests were never properly served.
17.

Clearly, these "Actual Facts" are the first-hand perceptions (actually mostly legal

arguments) of Plaintiff s counsel, not Plaintiff himself.
18.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and its many, many case

annotations further provide that affidavits "shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App at ^J20 (stating
"[an affidavit] largely based on unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture, and beliefs" may not be
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considered by the trial court); Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968); Norton v.
Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983).
19.

A lay witness5 opinion testimony is rarely admissible as evidence and "is limited

to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or a determination of a fact in
issue." Utah R. Evid. 701.
20.

As explained above, Plaintiff could not have been the person who perceived the

"Actual Facts"; rather, it was his attorney who claims to have done so. Moreover, examination
of the above "Actual Facts" reveals that they are mostly the legal opinions of Plaintiff s counsel.
Legal opinions should be similarly stricken from affidavits. See, e.g., Capital Assets Fin. Serv. v.
Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, cert, granted 9%2 P.2d 87, affd 994 P.2d 201.
21.

Lastly, Plaintiffs Affidavit makes no detailed factual statements and refers to no

documents. Utah courts have reasoned that bare assertions in an affidavit offered in opposition
to summary judgment motion will not suffice to oppose the motion. Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831
P.2d 97 (Utah 1992) (reasoning that bare assertions in an affidavit offered in opposition to
summary judgment that expert has reviewed the facts and based his or her opinion on them will
not suffice).
22.

Therefore, Plaintiffs Affidavit must be stricken.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court hereby enters
the following Order:
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Steven
Van Den Eikhof, dated August 25, 2010, is granted.

DATED thQ QJ)

day o f ( g i ( 5 f c b ^

2010.

FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

kjPGE Q. RAND BEAGHAM
G. Rand Beacham
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true a correct copy of the UNSIGNED ORDER
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